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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
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Para. 7.

Typical  
Special Reading  
to which the  
Americans are  
being subjected  
these days.

My general impression of Bolschwing, derived from his biographical statement, is not the best. His account of his own accomplishments and vicissitudes shows that he is an adventurer, a lover of intrigue, and a wire-puller who is fond of power. The fact that he helped the Guardist leaders to escape from Rumania in 1941 shows a strong sense of loyalty, but in this case it seems to have been misplaced loyalty. Bolschwing states that in his position in Rumania he was able to frustrate many of the evil designs of the Nazi regime, ~~and that he was able to~~ ~~arrange the escape of Sima~~ but it should be remembered as a black mark against him rather than a point in his favor that he arranged the escape of Sima and the others at a time when these men were at the height of their crimes. Bolschwing's professed love of democracy is rather peculiar when placed against this background. ~~Neither~~ Both the style and the content of his biographical statement, although some of the difficulties may be due to language problems, do not give the impression of a well-ordered ~~mind~~ or logical mind. It is difficult to understand how he reconciles his logical objection to "small scale nationalism (chauvinism)" with his considerable services to the chauvinistic Guard.

If one adds to these objections the difficulties inherent in Bolschwing's involvement with political reporting on Austria, it is hard to see how, among all our other commitments, much could be gained by having MOE take him over as principal agent for the three Rumanian projects. The alternative would be to try to divorce the projects from Bolschwing, by dealing directly with Margarit, supposing that the projects are worth continuing. My feeling is that there is something concrete which might be salvaged from these projects, but I am certainly not convinced that the three networks exist in the form claimed. How the ~~the~~ salvage operation could be accomplished is hard to say; in dealing with Margarit it must be remembered that ~~MOE~~ "PAPANACE appointed him intelligence coordinator for the Macedo-Rumanians in the fall of 1948" (see WGLA-1036). This means in practice that Projects 114, 115, and 116 are just as much under the control of Papanace political organization as they are under the control of Odeur, and certainly means that some of the funds supposedly devoted to the projects are being diverted into political channels. A complete analysis of this situation would require a long investigation of Margarit. Taking all these factors into account, and adding to them the lack of production from the projects, without which it is impossible to determine their positive worth, my reaction ~~is~~ is that they should not be considered further for MOE, unless greater evidence of their value is forthcoming.

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